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Abstract 
Currently managerial reforms in the UK public sector focus on performance measurement aimed at increasing 
accountability, value for money and the use of scarce resources. Through examination of this process in the 
National Health Service and higher education, this paper argues that this represents the imposition of private 
sector management practices and, therefore, represents further commodification of public sector services. The 
most likely outcome of these changes is not transformation of performance but deprofessionalisation of public 
sector workers. 
Keywords: Public Sector Reform, Commodification, Deprofessionalisation, Transformation, Management by 
Objectives, Cultural Change 
“More and more companies struggle with growing 
competition by introducing improvements into every 
aspect of performance. But the treadmill keeps moving 
faster, the companies keep working harder, and results 
improve slowly or not at all” (Pascale et al 1997, p.24) 
 
This paper is primarily conceptual in nature and 
considers the extent to which performance in the 
public sector is likely to be transformed through 
regimes of performance measurement. The central 
argument of this paper is that transformation is 
unlikely to be the outcome of such performance 
measurement regimes and more likely outcomes are 
further commodification of services which will be 
delivered by an increasingly deprofessionalised 
workforce. In making these arguments, the paper is 
organised in a fairly straightforward manner. The 
first section considers the nature of transformation in 
a management context, the use of management as a 
transformation agent in the public sector over the 
past two decades and provides two examples of 
performance measurement in the public sector. The 
second section considers the extent to which such 
management changes in the public sector can 
transform performance and makes the argument that 
commodification and deprofessionalisation are more 
likely outcomes because these changes (a) represent 
the importation of private sector philosophies and 
practices into the public sector and (b) the regimes 
of performance measurement are inherently flawed. 
The concluding section of the paper considers the 
implications of the arguments made. 
Transforming the Public Sector 
The OED defines transformation in terms of 
thorough or dramatic changes in form appearance 
and character. This paper is concerned with how 
this simple definition has been translated into an 
organisational context. Nuff and Backhoff (1997) 
point out the difficulties of doing this because the 
term has been defined in different ways in the 
management literature and much of that literature 
does not make a clear distinction between what a 
transformed organisation is and how an organisation 
is transformed. For example, Tichy and Devanna 
(1986) focus on vision and revitalisation, Land and 
Jarman (1992) draw attention to growth and 
complexity, Terry (1993) sees it in terms of a 
desirable future, Nanus (1989) combines vision, 
trust and inspiration, Kelley (1992) raises the issue 
of mightiness out of mediocrity and Covey (1990) 
concentrates on some kind of cultural 
metamorphosis. Notwithstanding the intellectual 
merits of discussion about meanings, the central 
point should not be lost that government has adopted 
the term transformation in its discussions and 
prescriptions for the public sector. In the National 
Health Service (NHS), for example, “change is an 
essential part of the transformation” (NHS, 2002, 
p.2) and in higher education the government offers 
“reforms which will transform the future of the 
sector” (Department for Education and Skills, 2002, 
p.1). 
In this specific public sector context, we would 
argue that transformation, as both a word and an 
action, has taken on its own peculiar characteristics 
and tends to be directed towards the delivery of 
services rather than the services themselves (Adcroft 
and Willis, 2002). As chief architect of the public 
sector, Beveridge saw its purpose as the eradication 
of the 5 evils of poverty, insecurity, ignorance, 
disease and squalor and, to a large extent, this 
statement of purpose remained constant for much of 
the post war period (Cutler et al 1986). Where there 
International Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Change Management, Volume 4 
244 
has been a significant change is in the prescriptions 
for how this is supposed to happen. Since the mid-
20th century, government prescriptions towards the 
public sector have concentrated on two issues; 
accessing increasing (financial) resources and 
improving the quality of management. Over the past 
20 years in particular, an increasing emphasis has 
been placed on management as the primary driver of 
change such that we can now characterise current 
attitudes to the public sector as resources with 
management strings attached. 
Thomson (1992) argues that the increasing 
emphasis on management was caused by a series of 
new assumptions around which government policy 
developed. The first of these assumptions was based 
around the (perceived) causes of the lack of 
economic competitiveness which highlighted 
weaknesses across all elements of the economy for 
which the government was responsible, “from 
nationalised industries to the education system” 
(p.33). The second assumption was the perceived 
failure of corporatism and collectivism and is 
reflected in the shift away from an emphasis on the 
demand side towards an emphasis which stressed the 
discipline of the market and the need for efficiency 
and value and money. Flynn (1995) highlights three 
intentions of this managerialism; increases in 
efficiency, a “results orientation” and an extension 
of the planning cycle (p.60). Not just in the UK but 
across the whole of Western Europe, economic and 
social pressures “make reform of the management 
methods in the public sector essential” (p.61). The 
net result of this, in the 1990s, was a much “more 
consciously managerial approach” (Thomson, 1992, 
p.34)) with a number of components such as 
organisational restructuring, improvements to the 
quality of service provision and shifts in public 
sector culture. 
Since the late 1990s this problem definition has 
been modified. Whilst the managerialism of the 
preceding decade and a half has remained, it is now 
coupled with increasing resources. The shift has 
happened relatively slowly. For example, central to 
the post-1997 government’s first term of office was 
the commitment to stick to the previous 
government’s spending plans and, as an illustration, 
“no increases in the basic rate or top rates of 
income tax” (Labour Party, 1997, p.7). However, 
post 2001 the new approach of resources with 
management strings attached has cemented itself 
with “a ten year vision for Britain’s public services; 
record improvements to match record investment” 
(Labour Party, 2001, p.17). Thus by the 2002 
budget, the government was arguing that its “long 
term goal was to ensure that taxpayers receive value 
for money” (Treasury, 2002a, p.3). Value for money 
is to be delivered by, amongst other things, Public 
Service Agreements (PSAs) which will create a 
“modern way of running good efficient public 
services” (Treasury, 2001, p.1). Our argument in this 
paper centres not on the need for more resources, or 
for the necessity for new and different management 
practices, but rather on the efficacy of the reformed 
structure itself to deliver on its own objectives. We 
would argue that in broadly accepting the 
assumptions, form and content of public sector 
managerialism, the result is a system in which 
measures of performance have become increasingly 
disconnected from the services being delivered; 
measurement is, therefore, unlikely to deliver on 
either the political or management objectives.  
In developing this point further, we now offer two 
examples of current regimes of performance 
measurement in the public sector. The first example 
is from the NHS and considers the importance of 
waiting list targets. The second example is from 
higher education and focuses on the process of 
Subject Review as a measure of the quality of the 
student experience. 
Exhibit #1: The NHS: resources and strings 
“cut NHS waiting lists by treating an extra 100,000 
patients as a first step by releasing £100 million saved 
from NHS red tape” (Labour Party, 1997, p.8) 
 
The reduction in NHS waiting lists grabbed all the 
headlines as it was one of the 5 key pledges made by 
the incoming government in 1997. It must, though, 
be recognised that this was just one element, albeit a 
reasonably indicative one, of a wider policy of 
reform towards the NHS. The reform of health care 
in the UK was built on the notion that the NHS had 
not been subject to sufficient change in the 
preceding decades. According to this problem 
definition, the NHS has “systematic problems, which 
date from 1948 when the NHS was formed” 
(Department of Health, 2000, p.2). In particular this 
broad problem definition focused on 4 key 
characteristics of the service that required change: 
There was a lack of national standards; there were 
too many old fashioned demarcations between staff 
and barriers between services; there were no clear 
incentives and levers to improve performance and, 
as a whole, the service was over-centralised and 
patents were disempowered. 
Turning the NHS around will happen through the 
creation of a new model which still conforms to 
Aneurin Bevan’s principle of being free at the point 
of use but with some modern characteristics such as 
new national standards of health care, more plurality 
in the numbers and types of providers, more patient 
choice and the ubiquitous shorter waiting times. In 
this context, the transformation starts from the a 
priori assumptions that there are major problems of 
under-funding caused by long term financial neglect 
and there are major problems of under-management, 
hence the need to change the way the service is run 
(Department of Health, 2000). Thus the solution to 
the problem definition is based on a combination of 
increased funding and managerial reform; resources 
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with strings attached. We will turn to examine 
resources first. 
Wanless (2000) argued that “the UK must expect 
to devote a significantly larger share of its national 
income to healthcare over the next 20 years” (p.4) 
and only if this happens can the UK hope to catch up 
with the standards of healthcare offered in other 
European countries. Therefore, the initial aim is to 
reach the European average of 9.4% of GDP spent 
on healthcare by 2008 which will involve annual 
increases in health spending of about 7.5% (The 
Treasury, 2002a). In the longer term, government 
plans are to increase spending over the next 20 years 
by between 4.2 and 5.1% annually in real terms. 
We now turn to consider the strings that have been 
attached to this financial largesse. Managerial 
reform in the NHS follows the typical strategy, 
policy, tactics model of rational decision making: At 
the strategic level, clearly defined aims and 
objectives are determined; at the policy level, 
choices are made as to how these aims and 
objectives will be met and, at the tactical level, these 
plans and policies are implemented. This case study 
will focus on NHS decision making at the strategic 
and policy levels. 
Strategic objective setting in the NHS is reflective 
of many things, not least the power of The Treasury 
in both economic and social policy making. The 
major string attached to the increasing resources 
comes from the NHS Public Service Agreement 
(PSA) through which the Secretary of State for 
Health is directly accountable for performance to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer: “In each area of 
service delivery … we are tying new resources to 
new reform and results, developing a modern way of 
running good efficient public services … the public 
can access the information” (The Treasury, 2002b, 
p.3)). From the PSA, three objectives are paramount: 
First, there should be improvements to service 
standards assessed by clear and measurable 
outcomes such as waiting lists and access to primary 
care; Second, health and social care outcomes for 
everyone should be improved with measurables such 
as mortality rates and teenage pregnancies; Finally, 
the service should deliver value for money through 
1-2% productivity and service improvements every 
year (The Treasury, 2002b). 
Clearly there is more to strategy and 
transformation than objective setting – judgement 
about the efficacy of any activity is based on what it 
actually achieves rather than on what it is supposed 
to achieve. The delivery of the objectives 
underpinning NHS reform will come from the NHS 
Plan which fully accepts the strings attached to the 
resources; “investment has to be accompanied by 
reform” (Department of Health, 2000, p.3). These 
reforms will take a number of different forms. There 
will be more joined up services, for example; “social 
services and the NHS will come together” (p.5). 
New working practices will form the basis of the 21st 
century NHS through new contracts for doctors and 
extensions to the role and duties of nurses, patients 
will have more input into NHS decision making and 
there will be more use of private resources 
(Department of Health, 2000). 
There is a clear and underlying logic to NHS 
reform; in the language of management it offers a 
consistent and coherent process. The process is 
centred on tangible and measurable outcomes which 
provide the rationale for the changes in management 
that are taking place and the basis of judgement as to 
whether those changes in management are 
successful. The PSA and the NHS Plan together 
provide a neat blend of the carrot and the stick. The 
carrot is provided through such things as increasing 
autonomy as “local NHS organisations that perform 
well for patients will get more freedom to run their 
own affairs” (Department of Health, 2000, p.4) and 
the stick is provided as it will become easier to 
compare and contrast performance across different 
sections of the service and, where there is 
underperformance, “the government will intervene 
more rapidly in those parts of the NHS that fail their 
patients” (Department of Health, 2000, p.10). 
Exhibit #2: Subject Review: all things to all people 
“The Agency’s mission is to promote public confidence 
that quality of provision and standards of awards in 
higher education are being safeguarded and enhanced” 
(Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education, 2002, 
p.1) 
 
Higher education offers an interesting and specific 
challenge for public sector management; how to 
maintain the quality of a service that is subject to 
ever increasing demand and take-up at the same time 
as units of resource are being diminished. For 
example, between 1998 and 2002, the number of 
new enrolments into higher education institutions 
increased by over one-fifth and the total number of 
students studying in higher education increased by 
over 6%. Whilst these figures suggest significant 
drop out rates, we would wish to avoid the debates 
about the implications of widening access and, 
instead, examine one of the key measurement 
processes through which this is managed. Thus this 
example focuses on the Subject Review process and 
the role of the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education (QAA). 
Notwithstanding the possibly pedantic point that 
the aim of the QAA is to ensure public confidence in 
the quality of higher education rather than to assure 
the actual quality of higher education, the subject 
review methodology differs in two substantial ways 
to the measurement regimes imposed elsewhere in 
the public sector. First, measurement is not based on 
central government directive but is determined by 
the institutions being measured; the methodology is 
developed around assessment of the institutions 
ability to meet its own aims and objectives. Second, 
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the process of measurement is carried out through 
peer review; whilst some elements of the process are 
based on simple number crunching, other elements 
are less obvious and apparent and, therefore, require 
some kind of academic judgement. Against the 
backdrop of these principles, the purpose of subject 
review is to “secure value from public investment”, 
“encourage improvements to the quality of 
education” and “provide … accessible public 
information” (QAA, 2000, p.2). 
The process involves breaking down higher 
education provision into a number of different 
compartments from the broad macro-level to the 
micro-level until a final measurement drops out. 
Overall, higher education in the UK is broken down 
into subject compartments; by the end of 2001, for 
example, 11 discreet subject areas had been through 
the review process. Each subject component is then 
considered on an institution by institution basis 
which means that provision is assessed across a 
number of different levels in institutions from, for 
example, HND through to Masters degree. Within 
institutions, the overall provision in an institution is 
compartmentalised into six aspects of provision 
which cover the whole of the student experience 
from initial application through to graduation, 
further study and employment. Finally the aspects 
are placed into a grading compartment depending on 
the extent to which aims and objectives have been 
met. 
At the core of the subject review process are the 
six aspects of provision. Combined together, these 
aspects work as a sort of higher education value 
chain which judges the quality of transformation 
from student input to graduate output. Using this 
value chain analogy, we can define the primary 
activities as Curriculum Design, Content and 
Organisation (CDCO), Teaching, Learning and 
Assessment (TLA) and Student Progression and 
Achievement (SPA). CDCO primarily deals with the 
content of the provision and the extent to which it is, 
for example, up to date, coherent and driven by 
learning outcomes. TLA is concerned with the 
delivery of the curriculum; what happens in the 
lecture theatres, seminar rooms and examination 
halls, again with an emphasis on coherence through 
a clearly articulated strategy. SPA is the only real 
numbers driven element of the review process and 
measures, amongst other things, the popularity of 
programmes, demographics of the student 
population, progression through different levels of 
study, graduation rates and employability. 
Supporting these primary activities are three further 
aspects: Student Support and Guidance (SSG), 
Learning Resources (LR) and Quality Management 
and Enhancement (QME). SSG considers all 
elements of support that students may need during 
their studies from academic guidance through 
pastoral welfare and onto careers advice. LR 
considers the availability within the provision of 
things like library resources, teaching 
accommodation and IT and administrative support. 
Finally, QME covers two key issues: how quality is 
assured within the provision and how quality is 
enhanced within the provision. 
The outcome of subject review is not a score; the 
provision within an institution does not get a final 
mark. Instead the outcome of a review is a profile of 
grades across each aspect of provision. This may 
seem like another pedantic point, given that it is 
common practice across the sector to view the 
outcome of the process in this manner, but the 
important point should not be lost that this is an 
unintended outcome. Each aspect of provision 
achieves a grade from 4 where the aspect makes a 
full contribution to the achievement of aims and 
objectives down to a 1 where aims and objectives 
are not met. The graded profile is significant 
because of the use made of subject review grades. 
For example, a grade of 1 in any aspect of provision 
results in a further review within 12 months and 
three or more aspects graded at 2 requires the 
institution to produce an improvement plan. 
Against a backdrop of increasing demand and 
reductions in the unit of resource, the subject review 
process attempts to deliver for a number of different 
stakeholders. For the government and the QAA the 
process attempts to ensure that available resources 
are used effectively; despite increasing demand for 
and take-up of higher education there should be no 
reduction in the quality of higher education. For the 
student stakeholder the aim is to convince about the 
value of qualifications earned in higher education 
and to allow for more informed decision making as 
to which programmes and institutions offer the best 
value. For the professionals in higher education, the 
aim is to balance the need for things like 
accountability against the desire for academic 
freedom through a system of measurement carried 
out by respected peers and assessed against criteria 
determined by those being assessed. 
The Outcomes of Transformation: 
Commodification and De-
Professionalisation 
The purpose of this section of the paper is to 
consider the outcomes of these management 
changes; will those outcomes be transformation or 
commodification? In the first section of the paper we 
offered a definition of transformation and it is now 
appropriate to offer definitions of commodification 
and deprofessionalisation. We would define 
commodification not as the transformation of 
performance but rather in terms of the 
transformation of relationships into quasi-
commercial relationships with an emphasis placed 
on the economic activity of buying and selling and 
the management activity of performance 
measurement. This could manifest itself, for 
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example, in the commercialisation of activities such 
as research in higher education institutions where 
there is an increasing focus placed on “harnessing 
knowledge to wealth creation” (Department for 
Education and Skills, 2002, p.12). At a more micro-
level, Lincoln (1998) notes the American experience 
where researchers are forced to “consider their work 
as a form of commodity” (p.263) but also draws 
attention to the commodification of society in 
general. This could manifest itself in the 
commercialisation or corporatisation of 
organisations previously exempt from business 
pressures. Again the American experience may be 
instructive; Altheide (1987) argues that the process 
inevitably spreads to all non-profit organisations that 
are forced to adopt “business processes and ideas” 
(p.619). 
If the process is one of commodification, then the 
outcome must inevitably be the resolution of “worth 
into exchange value” and the conversion of “the 
physician, the lawyer, the priest, the man of science, 
into paid wage labourers” (Marx and Engels, 1848, 
p56). This we would broadly categorise as 
deprofessionalisation. Weber (1927) distinguishes 
the professional through the rationalisation process 
involved in making decisions and this is further 
developed by Ritzer and Walczak (1988) who define 
a professional as someone whose activities are value 
driven where the crucial values are “altruism, 
autonomy and authority” (p.4). Transformation 
through commodification changes the basis of 
decision making such that values become much less 
important than the rules, regulations and 
performance measures of the organisation. For 
example, Bottery and Wright (2000) argue that a 
mixture of market initiatives and increased central 
control has fundamentally changed the nature of 
teaching as a profession and Ritzer and Walczac 
argue that there has been a substantial “decline in 
the ability of the medical profession to distinguish 
itself from bureaucrats and capitalists” (p.1). The 
case for a commodified outcome rests on the extent 
to which changes in public sector management are 
the result of the transfer in of management practices 
from the private sector and in making this argument 
the key issue is the rationale for the form and 
content of public sector performance measurement. 
Central to pretty much all measures of 
organisational performance is an understanding of 
the relationship between economic inputs and 
outputs. Performance as measured by such 
mechanisms as labour and capital productivity, 
return on investment, customer satisfaction, service 
quality and all the rest are simply different means to 
the same ends; what does the organisation get out 
for the investment put in? Whilst discussion of 
performance measurement starts with this simple 
and basic notion, the problem is that the process 
through which assessment is made is usually 
complex. Williams et al. (1993), in examining 
comparative productivity performance between 
Japanese and American car assemblers, argue that 
the problem of complexity manifests itself because 
performance is affected as much by market 
conditions, industry structures and social settlements 
as it is by purposive management action.  
Measuring the performance of the public sector is 
hardly a new or recent idea; in many ways the 
origins of the modern regimes of assessment lie in 
the 1980s and the early work of the Audit 
Commission (Local Government Finance Act, 
1982). With an early emphasis on the performance 
of local authorities in the UK, the work of the Audit 
Commission is important not only in terms of its 
managerial legacy but also as a tracking device to 
assess how structures have changed (Power, 1987). 
The Audit Commission began with a problem 
definition which stated that public sector (under) 
performance was a product of (poor) public sector 
management and the solution to these problems was 
the creation of frameworks which mimic the private 
sector (Audit Commission, 1988, Banham, 1987). In 
response to this specific problem definition, the 
public sector has, for example, been subjected to 
increased competition through compulsory 
competitive tendering and the imposition of quasi-
competition through internal markets and best value 
systems. The broad managerial context for these 
changes was the need for public sector organisations 
to become more strategic in their behaviour with the 
need for, for example, “corporate vision” and “a 
shared culture” (Audit Commission, 1986, p.15). 
Lawler and Hearn (1995) argue that this kind of 
public sector managerialism “implies that there are 
certain core functions of management applicable 
across all organisational contexts and that certain 
management techniques can be transferred across 
contexts – in this case, from the private to the public 
sector” (p.9). This is broadly representative of the 
wider view that the current relationship between 
public and private sectors is no longer about 
transferring assets from one to the other viz a viz 
privatisation but rather about transferring practices 
from one sector to the other (Adcroft and Willis, 
2002). Holloway et al. (1999) suggest that one of the 
main examples of this transfer is in the increased 
importance attached to benchmarking in the public 
sector; two-thirds of managers in the education and 
health sectors are involved in benchmarking of some 
sort or another. Again this is nothing new but more a 
reflection of the legacy of audit. In becoming more 
strategic, the Audit Commission argued, public 
sector organisations would benefit because they 
would become much less reactive and, hence, more 
proactive in their strategy making; change would be 
“anticipated” and “actions set in motion” (Audit 
Commission, 1986, p.12). This strategic focus would 
be developed through a traditional strategic 
equation. On one side of this management sum were 
internal procedures which would be built around 
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targets to be achieved with an emphasis on 
budgetary control and, on the other, would be 
external comparisons through some form of 
benchmarking. On this issue, Drucker (1995) argues 
that benchmarking is built on the assumption that 
“what one organisation does, any other organisation 
can do as well” (p.15). This rationale is followed 
through in a process based around measuring 
existing performance, comparing that performance 
to either an industry or market leader or some 
desired performance in the future, analysing the 
causes of differences in performance before 
implementing management actions to bridge the 
gap, often through emulation. 
Preoccupations with performance measurement are 
clearly built on the assumption that it will bring real 
and tangible benefits to organisations. Meyer (1994) 
suggests that performance measurement is useful in 
so far as it can “tell an organisation where it stands 
in its effort to achieve goals” but also points out that 
it is less useful in explaining “what it should do 
differently” (p.101). This point notwithstanding, 
other authors suggest a legion of benefits to be 
gained from good performance measurement and 
objective setting. Drucker (1995) discusses the 
benefits in terms of generating new and additional 
resources, clearer understandings of economic 
chains, wealth creation and as both the “creatures 
and creators of a material environment in which 
opportunities lie” (p.23). Equally prosaically, 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) in discussing the 
balanced scorecard, suggest the benefits are in the 
translation of the “company’s strategy and mission 
statement into specific goals and measures” which 
allow for, amongst other things “products to market 
sooner and innovative products tailored to 
customer’s needs” (p.124). If there are 
organisational benefits at the strategic level, there 
are also benefits further down the organisation’s 
food chain; “the average quality of decisions made 
day in day out will be vastly higher than before. 
When that happens you can bet the company’s 
performance will show it” (Ness and Cucuzza, 1995, 
p.70). 
If the benefits of setting objectives and measuring 
performance provide the rationale for management 
action, the next logical step in the discussion is to 
consider the processes involved in that management 
action. As Williams et al. (1993) have pointed out, 
albeit in a different context, the management 
response will depend on the interpretation of the 
measures and targets; accountants will call for new 
financial systems, engineers for new technology, 
personnel managers for more training and so on. The 
literature suggests a wide variety of management 
options from, for example, strategic processes drawn 
out of the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992), improved management of teams (Meyer, 
1994), return on management activities (Simons and 
Davila, 1998), ABC activities (Ness and Cucuzza, 
1995), the performance management manifesto 
(Eccles, 1991) and so on. For the purposes of this 
paper what is important is the translation of these 
principles into a public sector context. After all, as 
Drucker (1995) argues “what is important is not the 
tools. It is the concepts behind them” (p.23). 
The adoption in the public sector of these kinds of 
principles represents a number of key shifts, from 
the political level through to the operational level. 
The dominance of The Treasury, through Public 
Sector Agreements (PSAs), in objective setting may 
represent or illustrate a shift in Whitehall’s centre of 
gravity away from the social and the departments of 
state towards the economic and the power of the 
Chancellor. If part of this shift is about changing 
behaviour, as Thomson (1992) argues, then there is a 
logic to it as Kaplan and Norton (1992) suggest, an 
“organisation’s measurement system strongly affects 
the behaviour of managers and employees” (p.184). 
For Lawler and Hearn (1995) all of this has resulted 
in two significant changes at a more operational 
level. First, there has been a shift away from an 
emphasis on administration towards a harder and 
sharper focus on management and, second, there has 
been a process of deprofessionalisation as autonomy 
for many in the public sector has given way to 
activity based around the management of targets 
which are set elsewhere. The result of taking a set of 
private sector principles and applying them in the 
public sector is unlikely to guarantee that priorities 
will be set and met in a meaningful way. We would 
suggest that the outcome is likely to be that 
suggested by Meyer (1994); “The long held view 
that what gets measured gets done has spurred 
managers to react to intensifying competition by 
piling more and more measures on their operations 
in a bid to encourage employees to work harder. As 
a result, team members end up spending too much 
time collecting data and monitoring their activities 
and not enough time managing” (p.103). 
It could be argued that commodification is not a 
problem provided that it leads to an improvement in 
the quality of both services offered and how they are 
delivered. Were this to happen, the issue of 
commodification becomes one for just a few 
precious academics and doctors who yearn for a 
previous age where moth and rust did not corrupt; 
for many the price paid in deprofessionalisation may 
be one worth paying. All this depends on whether 
transformation happens. If services are not 
transformed then the outcome must necessarily be 
deprofessionalised pain paid for little, if any, user 
gain. Thus we now turn to consider some of the 
more systemic problems that underpin this approach 
to service improvement. We have identified six 
specific problems with the measurement systems 
which apply in varying degrees to the different 
examples shown: 
Problem 1: as services are broken down and 
deconstructed into ever smaller components, the less 
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the performance of the whole service is being 
measured. In making a judgement as to the value of 
a piece of music, for example, analysis is not carried 
out on a note by note basis but rather on how the 
notes fit together. Similarly, we would argue that 
much public sector provision should be treated in a 
gestalt manner where the overall quality of the 
provision is determined by how the individual 
elements fit together. For example, Subject Review 
in higher education actually militates against taking 
an overall view of the student experience; the 
outcome of the review is six individual grades for 
the aspects of provision and not, despite common 
practice, an overall mark out of 24. 
Problem 2: measurement can be the cause of 
uncertainty as much as certainty about overall 
performance because the individual elements 
measured are rarely independent of one another. 
Gore Vidal’s maxim that “it is not enough to 
succeed, others must fail” illustrates many of the 
problems in the public sector where resource 
constraints are still a fact of life. Improved 
performance in one area may well be the result of a 
retargeting of resources which, ceteris paribus, 
means worsening performance elsewhere. For 
example, in the NHS, poor performance in certain 
elements of preventative treatment maybe the result 
of improved performance in other elements of the 
service such as waiting lists. 
Problem 3: scientific approaches to measurement 
assume objectivity achieved through dispassionate 
analysis of the available evidence but subjective 
interpretation of the evidence is often the case. Is a 
glass half full or half empty? Where the process of 
measurement involves professionals from the field 
under measurement, it is impossible to get an 
absolutely objective measurement. For example, in 
considering the quality of curriculum design and 
delivery in higher education, subject reviewers will 
inevitably be influenced by their own intellectual 
and pedagogic preconceptions. Where much of the 
analysis of the student experience is based on the 
assessments of those directly involved as deliverer 
and participant, it is dubious as to whether the 
subjectivity of this information can always be 
objectively screened out. 
Problem 4: the use of the results of performance 
measurement in league tables assumes that all those 
being measured start from the same point. There are 
usually more sources of difference between same-
service providers than there are similarities. The 
performance of any organisation in a league table, 
be it a football team, university or hospital is 
determined by many different factors. Organisations 
may be playing the same game by the same rules but 
it does not necessarily follow that they are operating 
on a level playing field; at the start of each season, 
all teams may start with zero points but we know 
that only two or three teams have the financial 
resources to win the Premiership. Performance, and 
hence position, is determined by a whole series of 
internal and external factors from the entry 
qualifications of undergraduate students to the socio-
economic conditions faced by the NHS Trust. 
Educating undergraduates at the London School of 
Economics offers fundamentally different challenges 
to educating undergraduates at London Metropolitan 
University just as providing healthcare in 
Weighbridge is different to Hackney. These 
differences are rarely, if ever reflected in league 
tables. 
Problem 5: in any complex process of service 
delivery there will always be elements of that 
service which are beyond scientific measurement. In 
such cases, proxies are used whose relationship to 
the thing being measured can often be tenuous. 
Unwilling to face the repercussions of opposing the 
neo-liberal orthodoxy of the early-1980s, cabinet 
ministers would make references to Disraeli in their 
speeches. The long dead bastion of one-nation 
Toryism became a proxy for ineffectual anti-
Thatcherite conservatives because some things just 
could not be said. Similarly, some things cannot be 
measured but the dominance of scientific approaches 
demands that measurements are made of the next 
best thing using some kind of proxy. For example, 
measuring the extent to which students are 
supported through their studies in higher education 
is difficult and so the proxy of access to support 
mechanisms is used regardless of the efficacy of 
those mechanisms. 
Problem 6: the choice of targets and performance 
measurements can be used to cynically influence the 
results of measurement. The choice of what and how 
something is measured can often be about creating 
an impression of improvement rather than delivering 
any real improvement. The success of initiatives 
which are, for example, tough on crime often 
depends on which crimes are chosen to be tough on 
and, in any case, measures which are tough on the 
causes of crime are given less attention because they 
are, by their nature, less quantifiable and more 
ambiguous. Additionally, in higher education, the 
subject review process makes it difficult to 
differentiate between activities which are driven by 
objectives and objectives which are born out of 
activities. 
Conclusion 
The discussion and analysis contained in this paper 
leads to the obvious conclusion that we are sceptical 
about the extent to which public services can be 
transformed through existing management structures 
and regimes. In drawing this conclusion, we return 
to the three key concepts of transformation, 
commodification and deprofessionalisation. Kuhn 
(1996) offers an interesting explanation of the 
process of transformation in science. He argues that 
science is not the steady cumulative acquisition of 
knowledge but is rather “a series of peaceful 
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interludes punctuated by intellectually violent 
revolutions” where “one conceptual world view is 
replaced by another” (p.106) In science, therefore, 
revolutions are characterized by paradigm shifts. In 
making the intellectual leap from the natural and 
physical sciences to social scientific investigation, 
Nuff and Backoff (1997) argue that, in an 
organisational setting, transformation must involve 
such a paradigm shift and suggest that two 
conditions must be met in order for this to happen; 
first the organisation must make an absolute break 
with the past and, second, creative thinking must 
subsequently dominate management decision 
making. With a deep sense of irony, we can use 
these conditions as a benchmark to assess whether or 
not commodification and deprofessionalisation can 
deliver transformation. 
We have argued elsewhere (Adcroft and Willis, 
2000) that strategic decision making can be 
characterised as either optimisation where the 
emphasis is on improvements to existing products, 
services and processes or innovation where change 
is more revolutionary in character and the outcome 
is, indeed, paradigmic transformation. Under 
existing conditions, commodification can, at best, 
deliver only optimisation. The dismantling of 
services into individual activities to which scientific 
measures are applied has resulted in a kind of money 
and numbers game where the resources are directed 
primarily at those activities where the measures tell 
the right story. The commodification of a student’s 
experience at university into six aspects of provision 
or complex health services into tangible and 
measurable outcomes has, as an a priori assumption, 
the objective of getting more out of existing 
resources. Commodification, therefore, cannot 
create a world fundamentally different to the past 
but rather reinforces existing views of the world and 
creates an emphasis on what Marcuse (1964) 
referred to as “techniques, productivity and 
efficiency” (p.65). 
If one strand of public sector management, 
commodification, is reinforcing an existing 
paradigm, what are the chances of the second strand, 
deprofessionalisation, acting as a counterweight and 
thus instilling creativity in management decision 
making? Creativity has always been placed centre 
stage in any discussion of transformation. For 
example, Schumpeter (1934, 1939) discussed the 
role of creativity in economic development through 
the creation of new combinations and, more 
recently, Chaharbaghi and Willis (1999) have 
discussed the same thing in terms of the creation of 
“new market values” (p.67). The questions to 
consider are: Who does this? What type of person 
finds these new combinations? What sort of 
conditions do they operate under? These traits are 
well documented in, for example, the management 
literature on entrepreneurship and creativity and 
include risk taking and the need for achievement 
(McClelland, 1961), locus of control (Rotter, 1966) 
and the desire for autonomy and deviancy (de Vries 
1977). These are characteristics which are 
fundamentally and diametrically opposed to those of 
deproffesionalised workers. 
This title of this paper posed the question 
“commodification or transformation?” The outcome 
of the analysis is that you cannot have both. By 
accident or design, the outcome is commodification 
and the results will inevitably be disappointing for 
policy makers, user groups and the deliverers of 
services. If nothing else, it may all serve to prove JK 
Galbraith’s point that “politics is not the art of the 
possible. It consists in choosing between the 
disastrous and the unpalatable.” 
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